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Thomas Hobbes' Portrait
English Civil Unrest Put into Context

"My mother gave birth to twins: myself and fear," Hobbes reported, commenting on his premature birth on 5 April 1588 in Malmesbury, England, when his mother heard of the coming invasion of the Spanish Armada, a fleet of Spanish warships.[1] Hobbes had been born in the midst of Anglo-Spanish War (1585-1604), and he lived in a period of civil unrest leading to the English Civil War (1642-1651), leading him later to emphasize the determining power of fear more than any other philosopher. He even proposed that a political community be oriented around the fear of violent death, which he dubbed the greatest evil (summum malum). His emphasis on fear bears resemblance with previous Realist writers; even one of Hobbes’ first scholarly works was a translation of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian Wars in 1629, of which Hobbes said that he offered the translation as a reminder that the ancients believed democracy (rule by the people) to be the least effective form of government.

Hobbes’ Leviathan (Read)

The book Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civil (to be referred as Leviathan from this point forward for convenience) was published in 1651. Leviathan concerns the structure of society and legitimate government, which uses “social contract theory” (theory that typically addresses the questions of the origin of society and the legitimacy of the authority of the state over the individual) to conclude that we ought to submit to the authority of an absolute—undivided and unlimited—sovereign power. In the book, Hobbes wrote that civil war and the brute situation of a state of nature, which was "the war of all against all", could only be avoided by strong undivided government.[2]

Leviathan is divided into four main parts: Of Man, Of Commonwealth, Of a Christian Commonwealth, and Of the Kingdom of Darkness. Of Man takes account of human nature, explaining humanity in a materialistic way, and denies incorporeal body and substance. It also rejects finis ultimus (utmost aim) and summum bonum (greatest good) as previous thought had spoken of. Hobbes spoke of a summum malum (greatest evil), which was the danger of violent death. In the nature of man, Hobbes found three principal causes of quarrel: competition, diffidence, and glory. “The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation” (Leviathan Chapter XIII). Because the condition of man “is a condition of war of every one against every one, in which case every one is governed by his own reason, and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies,” Hobbes pointed out a number of laws of nature: first, “to seek peace and follow it”; and second, “by all means we can to defend ourselves” (Chapter XIV). What Hobbes suggested by that reason was to seek peace; however if peace could not be had, to use all of the advantages of war. He also suggested to renounce one's right to all things if others were willing to do the same, to quit the state of nature, and to enter covenants by fear with the authority to command them in all things. Hobbes concluded Of Man by articulating additional seventeen laws of nature in Chapter XV.

Of Commonwealth explains the purpose of a commonwealth, which is to restraint upon men to prevent consequent condition of war when there is no visible power to keep them and to tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants. The commonwealth is instituted when all agree in the following manner: “I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner” (Chapter XVII).

The rights of the sovereigns are as given in Chapter XVIII:

  1. The subjects cannot lawfully make a new covenant amongst themselves to be obedient to any other, in anything whatsoever, without permission from the sovereign (meaning the subjects cannot lawfully change the form of government).
  2. Because the covenant forming the commonwealth results from subjects giving to the sovereign the right to act for them, the sovereign cannot breach the covenant; and consequently the subjects cannot be freed from the covenant.
  3. The sovereign exists because the majority has consent their voice; the minority must consent with the rest and be contented to avow all the actions of the sovereign.
  4. Every subject by this institution is author of all the actions and judgments of the sovereign: hence the sovereign cannot injure any of his subjects and cannot be accused of injustice.
  5. Consequently, the sovereign cannot justly be put to death by the subjects.
  6. Because the end of this institution is peace and defense of the subjects, the sovereign has the right to judge the means of peace and defense, to do whatever he thinks necessary for the preserving of peace and security, by prevention of discord at home and hostility from abroad. Therefore, the sovereign may judge what opinions and doctrines are averse, who are to be trusted to speak to multitudes of people, and who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they are published.
  7. The sovereign may prescribe the rules of propriety (or meum and tuum) and civil law.
  8. The sovereign has the right of judicature in all cases.
  9. The sovereign has the right of making war and peace for the public good and to assemble, arm, and pay the forces.
  10. The sovereign may choose all counselors, ministers, magistrates, and officers, both in peace and war.
  11. The sovereign may reward with riches or honor, and to punish with corporal or pecuniary (monetary) punishment or ignominy (disgrace).
  12. The sovereign may establish laws of honor and a public rate of worth.

Analysis of Leviathan; Its Influence to Realism

Hobbes’ Leviathan shared the Realist perspective that humankind is not inherently benevolent but rather self-centered and competitive; in which human nature viewed as egocentric and conflicting (“the condition of man is a condition of war of every one against every one”) unless there exist conditions under which humans may coexist (“to enter covenants of commonwealth”). Such state of nature equals to the anarchy in international system. Leviathan thus provided a basis for the Realist understanding of international relations. Hans Morgenthau (1967, p. 113) credited Hobbes’ conception of international relations as providing the “stock of trade” of the discipline, while Michael Smith (1986, p. 13) praised that Hobbes’ “analysis of the state of nature remains the defining feature of Realist thought. His notion of the international state of nature as a state of war is shared by virtually everyone calling himself a Realist.” Charles W. Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf (1995, p.22) assured that the “recent realist thinking derives especially from the political philosophies of the Italian theorist Niccolo Machiavelli and the English theoretician Thomas Hobbes.” R. N. Berki (1981, p. 142) argued that there was continuity in “the tradition of Realpolitik from Machiavelli and Hobbes to Thompson and Morgenthau,” while Martin Wight (1991, p. 6-7) found the basic arguments of Hobbes’ Leviathan and E. H. Carr’s Twenty Years’ Crisis to be the same.

To understand how Hobbes fits the definition of Realism, we can see Jack Donnelly (2000, p. 14), who wrote that, in the natural condition of man that is a state of war, Hobbes demonstrated natural equality in typically “Realist” fashion: even “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others” (in Leviathan Chapter XIII). Donnelly (2000, p. 14) maintained that, “If some were much more powerful than others, social order might be forcibly imposed. Rough equality of capabilities, however, makes this anarchic world one of inescapable and universal danger.”

Donnelly commented on Hobbes’ three principal causes of quarrel: “for Hobbes… competition, diffidence, and glory may be controlled by superior power… But they cannot be eliminated.” Thus Donnelly maintained that the task of politics was to replace anarchic equality with hierarchical political authority. However, Donnelly argued that international relations remained a domain of anarchy, a state of war. “Barring world government, there is no escape from this state of war.” (ibid., p. 15)

A Reconsideration of Realism in Hobbes’ Leviathan

Despite the depictions of Hobbes as a theorist of Realism as this article previously mentioned, several writers argued that Hobbes might not be as close to a Realist understanding of international relations as has been prevalently held. A. Nuri˙ Yurdusev (2006) argued that given Hobbes’s conception of man and the state of nature, the formation of Leviathan and the law of nature, Hobbes gave us a perception of international relations which was not always conflicting and comprised the adjustments of conflicting interests, leading to the possibility of alliances and cooperation in international relations. Hobbes did not suggest the establishment of a world/international Leviathan because “while the interpersonal state of nature is unbearable, the international state of nature is bearable. In the interpersonal state of nature man has no culture, no industry, no art, no navigation, no civilisation and his life is poor, solitary, nasty and brutish. But, in the international state of nature as the states uphold the industry of their subjects, then, individuals do not have the misery that they experience in the interpersonal state of nature” (p. 315).

Theodore Christov (2009) saw that Hobbes’ depiction of voluntary alliances at the level of natural man situated him not as a theorist of lawlessness and anarchy but as a proponent of a highly complex dynamic of social cooperation and partnership. Christov argued that the international state of nature, analogous to group alliances in pre-civil condition, follows principles of cooperation effectively constraining states’ behavior. The Hobbesian international political order is, at its core, concerned with both security and well-being in a continual improvement of the international system.

Hobbes might have not been the theorist of international anarchy as Realists had been suggesting him to be, but his Leviathan work had been a reader in Realist IR theories for its contribution to the concept of international anarchy.


Bibliography

  • Berki, R. N. (1981) On Political Realism. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.
  • Christov, Theodore (2009) “Beyond International Anarchy: Thomas Hobbes on the Laws of Nations.” Draft for presentation at the University of Chicago Political Theory Workshop, 13 April 2009.
  • Donnelly, Jack (2000) Realism and International Relations. Cambridge University Press.
  • Hobbes, Thomas (1651) Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civil. Chapter XIII: Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning Their Felicity and Misery.
  • ___ (1651) Leviathan. Chapter XIV: Of the First and Second Natural Laws, and of Contracts.
  • ___ (1651) Leviathan. Chapter XV: Of Other Laws of Nature.
  • ___ (1651) Leviathan. Chapter XVII: Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a Commonwealth.
  • ___ (1651) Leviathan. Chapter XVIII: Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institution.
  • Kegley, Charles W. and Eugene R. Wittkopf (1995) World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 5th ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
  • Lloyd, Sharon A. and Sreedhar, Susanne. (2013) "Hobbes's Moral and Political Philosophy," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/hobbes-moral/
  • Morgenthau, Hans (1967) Scientific Man Versus Power Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Smith, Michael J. (1986) Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
  • Wight, Martin (1991) International Theory: The Three Traditions, ed. by Brian Porter and Gabriele Wight. Leicester: Leicester University Press.
  • Yurdusev, A. Nuri˙ (2006) “Thomas Hobbes and International Relations: from Realism to Rationalism.” Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 60, No. 2, p. 305-321, June 2006.


[1] “Thomas Hobbes Biography”, URL= http://www.notablebiographies.com/He-Ho/Hobbes-Thomas.html

[2] Lloyd, Sharon A. and Sreedhar, Susanne, "Hobbes's Moral and Political Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/hobbes-moral/

 
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Portrait of Niccolò Machiavelli by Santi di Tito http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e2/Portrait_of_Niccol%C3%B2_Machiavelli_by_Santi_di_Tito.jpg
Italian Renaissance Put into Context

Il Principe must have been the most well-known political treatise in the history of western political philosophy. The book successfully turned the author’s name into a rather negative term to characterize amoral politicians with ‘evil’ behaviors. To gain insight of why “Machiavellianism” was endorsed in the book during the Renaissance, this third installment in the series of historical antecedents of Realist IR theories will first deal with the context of the era in which Niccolò Machiavelli lived before discussing the content of the book.

Machiavelli was born at Florence, Italy, on 3rd May 1469, a turbulent era in which Italian city-states were in constant battle for regional influence and control. Italy would not be unified until four centuries later, and during the Renaissance Italy was divided into a number of warring northern-central Italian city-states, larger Papal States, and Naples. Florence, Milan, and Venice emerged as the dominant players that agreed to the Peace of Lodi in 1454, which saw relative calm brought to the region for the first time in centuries. However, Italian city-states soon fell into wars between 1494 and 1559 ignited by the rivalry between France and Spain, gradually lost their independence, and came under Spanish domination in 1559.

Machiavelli became official of the Florentine Republic after the Medici family, who had been ruling over Florence for sixty years, was expelled in 1494. He carried out several diplomatic missions; most notably to the Papacy in Rome, in the Italian states. He became witness of the Cesare Borgia's state-building, supported by his father Pope Alexander VI, that tried to bring a large part of central Italy under their possession through military means, justifying so by the pretext of defending Church interests. Machiavelli was trusted the Florentine militia in 1503 and staffed his army with citizens. He distrusted mercenaries due to their unpatriotic nature, making their allegiance fickle and often to waver when most needed. Under Machiavelli's command, Florentine citizen-soldiers defeated Pisa in 1509.

Machiavelli was deprived of office in 1512 after the Medici defeated the Florentines at Prato, exiled then Florentine head of state Piero Soderini, and dissolved the city-state and republic. The Medici accused Machiavelli of conspiracy against them and had him imprisoned and tortured. However, he denied involvement and was released after three weeks. He then retired and devoted himself to study and to the writing of the political treatises. This was around the time when he wrote Il Principe.

Machiavelli’s Il Principe (The Prince)

Il Principe is one of the first works of modern political philosophy in which the effective truth is taken to be more important than any abstract ideal (what "it is" is more important than what "it should be"). Il Principe proposes that a prince can justify the use of immoral means to achieve the ends such as glory and survival: "he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation" (Il Principe Chapter XV). Because of that, Il Principe came in direct conflict with the dominant Catholic and scholastic doctrines of the time concerning how to consider politics and ethics.

The subject matter in Il Principe is new princedoms; meaning the state acquired not through hereditary, but through arms, fortune, or ability (Il Principe Chapter I and II). The strength of all principalities ought to be measured by "whether a prince has such power that, in case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether he has always need of the assistance of others" (Il Principe Chapter X).

Having discussed the importance of defense and military, Il Principe turns to state that "the chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite, are good laws and good arms" (Il Principe Chapter XII). A self-sufficient prince should be "armed" with his own arms, warned Machiavelli, as he opposed the use of mercenaries, believing that they were useless to a ruler because they were undisciplined, cowardly, and without any loyalty, being motivated only by money. Il Principe warned against using auxiliary forces, troops borrowed from an ally, because if they won, the employer was under their favor and if they lost, he was ruined (Il Principe Chapter XIII). Machiavelli advised that "a prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline" (Il Principe Chapter XIV). The two activities Machiavelli recommended a prince practice to prepare for war were physical and mental: to learn the landscape of his territories and to study of past military events.

Machiavelli's pragmatic ideal can be seen most clearly in the next chapters of Il Principe. Concerning qualities for which princes were praised, Machiavelli encouraged that a prince should not be overly concerned about having all the good ones, since most important is only to seem to have these qualities. Machiavelli believed it was necessary for a prince "to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity" (Il Principe Chapter XV). If a prince was overly generous to his subjects, Machiavelli asserted he would not be appreciated, and will only cause greed for more. When resources were exhausted, and the prince decided to discontinue or limit his generosity, he would be labeled as a miser. "Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of magnificence" (Il Principe Chapter XVI).

Machiavelli's pragmatism continued in the next chapters. Concerning cruelty and clemency, Machiavelli wrote, "one should wish to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with," yet a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that "if he does not win love, he avoids hatred" (Il Principe Chapter XVII). Fear is simply a means to an end, and that end is security for the prince.

Il Principe Chapter XVIII "Concerning the Way in which Princes Should Keep Faith" was noted as having "given greater offence than any other portion of Machiavelli's writings" by L.A. Burd in his edition of Il Principe (1891), p. 297. Here Machiavelli proposed that a prince should only keep his word when it suits his purposes, and to neglect faith "when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer." A prince should not break his word unnecessarily, and should avoid being despised and hated so that he was not easily conspired against. Machiavelli encourage that a prince "ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other from without, on account of external powers," the former secured by avoiding being hated and despised, and by keeping the people satisfied with him (Il Principe Chapter XIX).

The rest of Il Principe dealt with the prudence of the prince. Machiavelli opposed use of fortresses in conquered territories (Chapter XX); encouraged that a prince truly gained renown by completing great enterprises (Chapter XXI); wrote concerning the secretaries of princes (Chapter XXII); and proposed to avoid flatterers (Chapter XXIII). Machiavelli also wrote about prudence and chance, "Why the Princes of Italy Lost Their States" (Chapter XXIV), concerning fortune (Chapter XXV), and "An Exhortation to Seize Italy and to Free Her from the Barbarians" (Chapter XXVI).

Analysis of Il Principe; Its Influence to Realism

It is believed that Machiavelli had written Il Principe in 1513 for the instruction of the Medici after they had just regained power in Florence; Machiavelli wrote in his letter of dedication that his work was dedicated to "The Magnificent Lorenzo di Piero de' Medici." That led some authors to interpret Il Principe as political satire or as deceit. Jean-Jacques Rousseau was one who said Il Principe as a satire in his Social Contract, Book 3, n. 23. Antonio Gramsci argued that the purported audience for Il Principe was the common people to learn the methods of the ruling class. Mary G. Dietz (1986) even commented that Machiavelli's intention was "to undo Lorenzo de Medici by giving him advice that would jeopardize his power, hasten his overthrow, and allow for the resurgence of the Florentine republic" (Dietz (1986) "Trapping the Prince: Machiavelli and the Politics of Deception", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 3 (Sep., 1986), p.777-799)" Dietz argued that Machiavelli encouraged the prince to live in the city he conquers to makes it easier for rebels or a civilian militia to attack and overthrow the prince. Machiavelli also supported arming the people despite the fact that he knew the Florentines were decidedly pro-democratic and would oppose the prince.

Whether Il Principe was truly intended as a political satire and as deceit or not, the work was one of the first works that emphasized the need for realism as opposed to idealism. Machiavelli did not explain what he thinks the best ethical or political goals were; he took it for granted that would-be leaders naturally aim at glory and survival. Machiavelli believed that a strong state was one that could defend itself and didn't need to depend on allies. It complied with the Realist assumption that states must arrive at relations with other states on their own, rather than it being dictated to them by some higher controlling entity. It also preceded Realist proposal that the primary concern of all states was survival, which required strong military, leading Machiavelli to propose a prince to prepare for war even in peace times.

Machiavelli was born in an era of constant antagonism in Italy, leading him to emphasize power politics. He denied of the power of justice and was sensitive to harsh necessity and elusive chance. He was also in favor of balancing in regard of two warring states, similar to what Kenneth Waltz later suggested in his 1979 Theory of International Politics:

"... when a prince declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories after all are never so complete that the victor must not show some regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again." (Il Principe Chapter XXI)

Martin Wight listed Machiavelli as one of four seminal thinkers in international theory in his book Wight, Martin (2005) Four Seminal Thinkers in International Theory: Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant, and Mazzini; writing "his name became a byword in the sixteenth century for the slick, unprincipled trickster in politics, the sneaking assassin with a stiletto, or the masterly diplomatic operator, aiming at success" (p.3). Machiavelli might have not been the advocate of unscrupulous politicians described in his Il Principe, but his work had been a reader in Realist IR theories for its contribution to Renaissance political realism.
 
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Kautilya artistic depiction http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cd/Chanakya_artistic_depiction.jpg
Kautilya’s Arthashastra (Read)

The second article in the series of historical antecedents of Realist IR theories will deal with the thoughts of Kautilya, an Indian philosopher and royal advisor who wrote Arthaśāstra. Kautilya served as the chief advisor to Chandragupta, the first Maurya emperor in India. He was originally a professor of economics and political science at then Takshashila University, considered as pioneer of both fields for his work of Arthaśāstra became an important precursor classical economics. The title has been translated in various ways, such as “science of politics,” or a treatise to help a king in “the acquisition and protection of the, by R.P. Kangle, “treatise on polity” by A.L. Basham, “science of material gain” by Kosambi, “science of polity” by G.P. Singh, and “science of political economy” by Roger Boesche. It discusses statecraft, economic policy, and military strategy, and is divided into fifteen books.

Roger Boesche (2003) describes Arthaśāstra as offering “wide-ranging and truly fascinating discussions on war and diplomacy.” He notes that Kautilya wishes “to have his king become a world conqueror” (Arthaśāstra Book VI Chapter I), which Boesche interprets as “conquering up to what Indians regarded as the natural borders of India, from the Himalayas all the way south to the Indian Ocean, and from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal”, excluding the land of “barbarians” or mlecchas, those outside of Indian culture (Boesche, 2003, pp. 17). Boesche also calls Kautilya a political realist who analyzed that an alliance will last only as long as it is in that ally’s as well as one’s own self-interest, in which Kautilya wrote “preference to the army or to the ally should depend on the advantages of securing the appropriate place and time for war and the expected profit” (Arthaśāstra Book VIII Chapter I).

Boesche also underlines Kautilya’s analysis of which kingdoms are natural allies and which are inevitable enemies, or the so-called Mandala theory of foreign policy, in which immediate neighbors are considered as enemies, but any state on the other side of a neighboring state is regarded as an ally (“the enemy of my enemy is my friend”). In Arthaśāstra Book VI Chapter II, Kautilya wrote “The king who is situated anywhere immediately on the circumference of the conqueror's territory is termed the enemy. The king who is likewise situated close to the enemy, but separated from the conqueror only by the enemy, is termed the friend (of the conqueror).” Boesche describes the Mandala theory as follows: “Imagine a series of states to one’s west, and then number them starting with oneself. States numbered 1, 3, 5, 7, and so on will likely be friends, whereas states 2, 4, 6, 8, and so on will probably be enemies” (Boesche, 2003, pp. 18). In doing so, Boesche borrows from Arthaśāstra Book VII Chapter XVIII: “The third and the fifth states from a madhyama king are states friendly to him; while the second, the fourth, and the sixth are unfriendly. If the madhyama king shows favour to both of these states, the conqueror should be friendly with him; if he does not favour them, the conqueror should be friendly with those states.”
Boesche notes that Kautilya was willing to make treaties he knew he would break, as Kautilya wrote in Arthaśāstra Book VII Chapter XIV: “When the conqueror is thus attacked by the combined army of his enemies, he may tell their leader: ‘I shall make peace with you’ … The combination being broken, he may set the leader against the weak among his enemies.” Boesche concludes that “Because a king abides by a treaty only for so long as it is advantageous, Kautilya regarded all allies as future conquests when the time is ripe” (Boesche, 2003, pp. 21).

Kautilya’s concept of war and peace is divided into five forms of peace and three forms of war (Arthaśāstra Book VII Chapter VI):

  1. Peace with no definite terms (aparipanita): an agreement of peace with no terms of time, space, or work with an enemy made merely for mutual peace;
  2. Peace with no specific end (akritachikírshá): an agreement of peace in which the rights of equal, inferior, and superior powers concerned in the agreement are defined according to their respective positions;
  3. Peace with binding terms (kritasleshana): an agreement of peace kept secure whose terms are invariably observed and strictly maintained so that no dissension may creep among the parties;
  4. The breaking of peace (kritavidúshana): a broken agreement of peace;
  5. Restoration of peace broken (apasírnakriyá): a reconciliation made with a servant, or a friend, or any other renegade.

  1. Open battle: a battle fought in daylight and in some locality;
  2. Treacherous battle;
  3. Silent battle: the killing of an enemy by employing spies when there is no talk of battle at all.

Kautilya proposed that a king with a strong army may undertake an open fight, otherwise he should fight a treacherous battle (Arthaśāstra Book X Chapter III). Boesche takes note of Kautilya's doctrine of silent war or a war of assassination against an unsuspecting king and his approval of secret agents who killed enemy leaders and sowed discord among them (Boesche, 2003, pp. 23).

Kautilya also viewed women as weapons of war, using women against the enemy by "exhibiting women endowed with bewitching youth and beauty" then "by causing the woman to go to another person or by pretending that another person has violently carried her off, they may bring about quarrel among those who love that woman" (Arthaśāstra Book XI Chapter I).

Kautilyas Arthaśāstra Influence to Realism

Kautilya is regarded as the first great political realist because of his harsh pragmatism in the Arthaśāstra, in which he found no questions as immoral: he was willing to make break treaties he made, he preached of silent war or a war of assassination against an unsuspecting king, he approved of secret agents who killed enemy leaders and sowed discord among them. His Arthaśāstra was also a book of political realism, in which he analyzed how the political world did work and not very often stating how it ought to work. Kautilya argued that in the world of international politics (combination of states), it was natural that nations interact with each other with "means of sowing the seeds of dissension; and in the case of the powerful, it is by means of coercion" (Arthaśāstra Book IX Chapter VII), reflecting a political realist's argument that there will always be conflict in international relations and, in effect, the strongest state will rule. Kautilya also provided a realist's assumption that every nation acts to maximize power and self-interest, and therefore moral principles or obligations have little or no force in actions among nations ("preference to the army or to the ally should depend on the advantages of securing the appropriate place and time for war and the expected profit," Arthaśāstra Book VIII Chapter I).

Kautilya's view continued Thucydides' History a century after, who regarded the request for negotiation as a sign of weakness (see the Melian Dialogue). Unless a nation forced to rely on the kindnes of neighboring states can change rapidly, it is doomed to destruction ("When a king of inferior power ... request a third king of superior power, ... If the king to whom this proposal is made is powerful enough to retaliate, he may declare war; but otherwise he may accept the proposal", Arthaśāstra Book VII Chapter VII). In the same way as Thucydides', Kautilya demonstrated the ineffectiveness of moral pleas when confronted by a superior power.

Kautilya's Arthaśāstra has also been compared to Machiavelli's Il Principe of later antiquity: Max Weber in Politics as a Vocation (1919) observed, "Truly radical 'Machiavellianism', in the popular sense of that word, is classically expressed in Indian literature in the Arthasastra of Kautilya (written long before the birth of Christ, ostensibly in the time of Chandragupta [Maurya]): compared to it, Machiavelli’s The Prince is harmless" (quoted in Boesche, 2003, pp. 1).

Kautilya's emphasis on the dissensions in the combination of states predates the Realist's assumption that the international system is anarchic, forcing states to arrive at relations with superior power, rather than requesting for negotiation. Kautilya confirmed that states tend to pursue self-interest, even alliances and treaties shall break on the consideration of advantages and profit.
 
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Thucydides' bust at Royal Ontario Museum http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/10/Thucydides-bust-cutout_ROM.jpg
International Relations study is the study of relationships among nations within the academic field of political science. IR theory has been drawing on the work of other social sciences, developing several wide and deep epistemological positions in analyzing international relations. Among the diverse conceptual frameworks, however, the most dominant approach to IR study is arguably the Realist theory. Realism is a positivist approach that states that world politics is driven by competitive self-interest. As Donnelly in Reus-Smit’s and Snidal’s The Oxford Handbook of International Relations (2008, p. 150) wrote, Realism believes that (1) the international system is anarchic, meaning that there is no actor above states capable of regulating their interactions, and that states must arrive at relations with other states on their own, rather than it being dictated to them by some higher controlling entity. This creates a state of constant antagonism in the international system. Realism also believes that (2) states are the most important actors, and that (3) all states within the international system are unitary, rational actors, meaning that states tend to pursue self-interest, and that groups of states strive to attain as many resources as possible. Lastly, Realism proposes that (4) the primary concern of all states is survival. To survive, states build up military, which in turn may lead to a security dilemma among states.

Realism first developed after World War II, yet earlier writings have been cited as historic antecedents of today’s theories. Many scholars refer to Sun Tzu's The Art of War (6th century BC), Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War (5th century BC), Chanakya's Arthashastra (4th century BC), Hobbes' Leviathan, and Machiavelli's The Prince as the inspiration that gave Realist theory its primary assumptions, with providing further elaboration.

This series of articles aims to discuss the earlier writings that provided the above primary assumptions of Realist theories. This first article presents the thoughts of Thucydides, an ancient Greek historian who wrote the History of the Peloponnesian War and is also cited as an intellectual forbearer of realpolitik.

Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War (Read)

Thucydides was an Athenian historian who also happened to serve as an Athenian general during the Peloponnesian War. The war itself was fought between the Peloponnesian League (led by Sparta) and the Delian League (led by Athens). When the land of Amphipolis, which was under the Thucydides’ influence in the Thracian region of the Athens, fell under Spartan general Brasidas in 423 BC, Thucydides took the blame of his failure to save the land for he had been unable to reach it in time. Thucydides was then sent into exile, enabling him to travel freely among the Peloponnesian allies and to view the war from the perspective of both sides. During this time, he conducted research on the war, thinking it would be one of the greatest wars waged among the Greeks in terms of scale, then wrote a historical account of the war titled History of the Peloponnesian War. (For convenience, we will refer to the book as History from this point forward.)

Cause of War: Growth of Athens’ Power and Sparta’s Security Dilemma

History consists of eight books. The first book seeks to explain why the Peloponnesian War broke out, while the remainders (books 2 through 8) focus on the war itself. In the first book, Thucydides wrote, “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable (History 1.23).” Since fifty years before the outbreak of the war, Athens had been developing as a major power in the Mediterranean region. They started out as a small group of city-states called the Delian League, formed as an anti-Persian alliance in the end of the Persian Wars between the Achaemenid Empire of Persia and the Hellenic city-states (499-449 BC). They grew stronger and their influence began to dominate other city-states, proceeding to conquer all of Greece except for Sparta and its allies, and became recognized as the Athenian Empire. Several of Athens’ formerly independent allies were reduced to the status of tribute-paying subject states to the Delian League; the tribute was used to support a powerful fleet and subsequently to fund massive public work programs in Athens. It ensured resentment toward the Athens.

Friction between Athens and the Peloponnesian states, including Sparta, began after the departure of the Persians from Greece in the end of the Persian Wars. Sparta attempted to prevent the reconstruction of the walls of Athens, which protected Athens from land attack by the Sparta, but the attempt was rebuffed (History 1.89-93). Another friction flared up in 465 BC, when a land of Helot ruled by Sparta revolted, the Spartans summoned forces from all of their allies, including Athens, to help them suppress the revolt. Upon arriving, Athens’ force was dismissed by the Spartans, while all other allies’ were permitted to remain, out of fear that the Athenians would switch sides and support the rebellion. The offended Athenians repudiated their alliance with Sparta (History 1.102), and when the surrendering Helots had been permitted to evacuate the country, the Athenians settled them at the strategic city of Naupactus on the Corinthian Gulf (History 1.103).

In 459 BC, when two Spartan allies of Megara and Corinth were conflicting, Athens concluded alliance with Megara, giving them a critical foothold on the Isthmus of Corinth (a narrow land bridge which connects the Peloponnese peninsula with the rest of the mainland of Greece, near the city of Corinth). It resulted in a fifteen-year conflict of the First Peloponnesian War between the Athens and several states: Sparta, Corinth, Aegina, etc. In the aftermath, the Athens ceded the lands they had won on the Greek mainland, and both Athens and Sparta recognized each other's right to control their respective alliance systems. The war was officially ended by the Thirty Years' Peace, signed in the winter of 446/5 BC.

The Peace was tested following the defeat of Corinth to the sea power of Corcyra. Corinth then began to build an allied naval force, which alarmed Corcyra into seeking alliance with Athens. Athens then decided to swear a defensive alliance with Corcyra, and in the Battle of Sybota (433 BC) between Corcyra and Corinth, provided several warships to prevent a Corinthian fleet from capturing Corcyra but not to intervene unless Corinth invaded first. Subsequently, Athens instructed Potidaea, a tributary ally of Athens but a colony of Corinth, to dismiss the Corinthian magistrates from office (History 1.56). The angered Corinthians then encouraged Potidaea to revolt and unofficially sneaked contingents into the city to help defend it. This was a direct violation of the Thirty Years' Peace, which stipulated that the Delian League and the Peloponnesian League would respect each other's autonomy and internal affairs. Both sides went to war against each other.

The war that ensued was named the Archidamian War (431-421 BC) after Sparta’s king Archidamus II, in which the land-based power Spartan strategy was to invade the land surrounding Athens, while the naval power Athenian strategy as advised by General Pericles was to avoid open battle and to rely instead on the fleet. In 430 BC, an outbreak of a plague hit Athens and in the long run would become a significant cause of its final defeat. After Pericles’ death, the Athenians turned more aggressive as Cleon, a hawkish leader, rose to prominence. Cleon won a great victory at the Battle of Sphacteria (425 BC) and the Athenians captured between 300 and 400 Spartan hostages, giving the Athenians a bargaining chip. However, Spartan general Brasidas raised an army of allies and Helots and captured the Athenian colony of Amphipolis in Thrace, which controlled several nearby silver mines and whose product supplied much of the Athenian war fund. Both Brasidas and Cleon were killed in Athenian efforts to retake Amphipolis in 422 BC. The Spartans and Athenians agreed to exchange the hostages for the towns captured by Brasidas, and signed a truce named the Peace of Nicias (421 BC).

In 415 BC, Athens began a military expedition to Sicily after hearing that their distant allies in Sicily were under attack from Syracuse. The expedition was hampered from the outset by uncertainty in its purpose and command structure, thus resulting in immense defeat for the Athenians on the hands of Syracuse, Corinth, and Sparta. The Lacedaemonians then took the war to Athens; they fortified Decelea, near Athens, and prevented the Athenians from making use of their land year round, prevented the shipment of supplies overland and by sea to Athens, and disrupted the nearby silver mines freeing 20,000 Athenian slaves. Subsequently the Athenians were forced to demand even more tribute from her subject allies, further increasing tensions and the threat of further rebellion within the Empire. Lacedaemon then encouraged the revolt of Athens's tributary allies, and indeed much of Ionia rose in revolt against Athens. The Athenians managed survived for the belligerents were lacking in initiative, and because they had put aside some money and 100 ships that were to be used only as a last resort. Between 410 BC and 406 BC, Athens won a continuous string of victories, and eventually recovered large portions of its empire.

The end of the Peloponnesian War was decided when a Spartan General Lysander received a minor victory in the Battle of Notium in 406 BC. It led to a trial in Athens that resulted in the execution of six of Athens’ top naval commanders, demoralizing Athens’ navy and challenging its naval supremacy. Lysander’s Spartan fleet then sailed at once to the Hellespont, the source of Athens' grain, and defeated the Athenian fleet in the Battle of Aegospotami (405 BC). Facing starvation and disease from the prolonged siege, Athens surrendered in 404 BC, and its allies soon surrendered as well. The Spartans took Athens into their own system and set up a reactionary regime ruled by the ‘Thirty’ oligarchy.

Thucydides’ History Influence to Realism

Thucydides is regarded as an intellectual forbearer of realpolitik for he views the relations between nations (in History’s regard, between Sparta’s Peloponnesian League and Athens’ Delian League) as based on might or power rather than might (Leo Strauss, 1962). In the Book 5 of History, Thucydides wrote the Melian Dialogue, a fictionalized speech inserted for dramatic effect taking place in 416-415 BC between the Athenians and the people of Melos, a small, peaceful, and defenseless island located east of Sparta. The Athenians demanded that the Melians surrender their city and pay them tribute, or be destroyed. The Melian Dialogue opened up many arguments over what moral considerations, if any, should limit the exercise of imperial power of coercion. The Melians, who refused to cooperate, fell into the hands of the Athenians. The Melian Dialogue describe early instances of realpolitik or power politics. Thucydides also used strict "scientific history" standards, in which he didn’t mention the role of the gods as opposed to other classic writings of Herodotus, and he gathered evidence and analyze in terms of cause and effect.

Thucydides’ History confirmed the anarchical nature of the international system, in which there was a state of constant antagonism between Sparta and Athens. It developed that the cause of the Peloponnesian War was the Athens’ power buildup, which in turn led to Sparta’s security dilemma. It was also preoccupied with the interplay of justice and power in political and military decision-making, suggesting that considerations of justice are artificial and that it was necessary to attain as much power as possible. It was among the first historical writings to provide the basic assumptions of Realism, as opposed to other classic writings that frequently viewed history as a source of moral lessons, with conflicts and wars as misfortunes flowing from initial acts of injustice perpetuated through cycles of revenge.